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Abstract
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms
in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dom-
inant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post bud-
get balanced.
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1 Introduction
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the
public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy
incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
2 Setup
The following is as in Bo¨rgers (2013), a special case of the more general d’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979).
A public good problem with independent private values is a tuple consisting of the
following ingredients: A set I of N agents; for each agent i ∈ I, a set of possible private
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values (for the indivisible non-excludable public good) θi ∈ Θi = [θi; θi] ⊂ [0,∞), which
is private information to the agent; the cost of providing the public good c > 0. Let
Θ = ×i∈IΘi and, for all i ∈ I let Θ−i = ×j∈I,j 6=iΘj with typical element θ−i.
For a public good problem an allocation rule can be written as a function q from the
set of value-profiles, Θ, to the set {0, 1}, where a 1 indicates the provision of the public
good and a 0 indicates that the public good is not provided.
A direct mechanism for a public good problem consists of an allocation rule and a set
of transfer functions, ti, one for each agent i ∈ I, where the transfer (possibly negative) is
a money amount that is taken from the agent and given to the mechanism designer. The
transfer functions are functions from the set of value-profiles to RN . A direct mechanism
for a public good problem is ex-post budget balanced (EPBB) if, for all value-profiles, the
sum of all transfers to the designer is equal to the cost of providing the public good if the
public good is provided and equal to zero otherwise.
A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if “truth-telling”
(i.e. stating ones type) is a (weakly) dominant strategy. It is ex-post individually rational
(EPIR) if, for any value-profile, any agent expects a weakly higher payoff from partici-
pating in the mechanism than from not participating.
3 Useful Known Results
The following is, almost verbatim, Proposition 4.5 of Bo¨rgers (2013).
Proposition 1 A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if
and only for every i ∈ I and for every θ−i ∈ Θ−i, there are functions θˆi, τi and τˆi from
the set Θ−i to the set of real numbers R such that:
θi < θˆi(θ−i) ⇒ q(θi, θ−i) = 0 and ti(θi, θ−i) = τi(θ−i);
θi > θˆi(θ−i) ⇒ q(θi, θ−i) = 1 and ti(θi, θ−i) = τˆi(θ−i);
θi = θˆi(θ−i) ⇒ q(θi, θ−i) = 0 and ti(θi, θ−i) = τi(θ−i) or
q(θi, θ−i) = 1 and ti(θi, θ−i) = τˆi(θ−i);
τˆi(θ−i)− τi(θ−i) = θˆi(θ−i)
The proof is in Bo¨rgers (2013).
The following is, almost verbatim, Proposition 4.6 of Bo¨rgers (2013).
Proposition 2 A dominant strategy incentive compatible direct mechanism is ex post
individually rational (EPIR) if and only for every i ∈ I and for every θ−i ∈ Θ−i:
ti(θi, θ−i) ≤ θiq(θi, θ−i).
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4 Full Characterization
Lemma 1 Consider a dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) direct mechanism.
For all i ∈ I, let θˆi be defined as in Proposition 1. Then θˆi, is a weakly decreasing function
in all its arguments (i.e. in all θj with j 6= i).
Proof: W.l.o.g. consider agent 1 and consider an arbitrary profile θ−1 = (θ2, ..., θN). Now
let θ1 = θˆ1(θ−1). Then, by definition, we have that q(θ′1, θ−1) = 0 for all θ
′
1 < θ1 and
q(θ′1, θ−1) = 1 for all θ
′
1 > θ1. Now assume that q(θ1, θ−1) = 1. W.l.o.g. consider now
agent 2. Let θ˜2 > θ2 and let θ˜−1 = (θ˜2, θ3, ..., θN), or in the case of N = 2 simply
θ˜−1 = θ˜2. By DSIC (Proposition 1) for agent 2 we must have that q(θ1, θ˜−1) = 1 also. By
DSIC (Proposition 1) for agent 1 we then obtain that for all θ′1 > θ1 we must have that
q(θ′1, θ˜−1) = 1 as well. Thus, θˆ1(θ
′
2, θ˜−1) ≤ θ1 = θˆ1(θ−1), which is what we wanted to show.
For the case that q(θ1, θ−1) = 0 a similar argument applies. Instead of θ˜2 > θ2 we need
to choose θ˜2 < θ2 and then go through the appropriate steps. QED
Now to the main result, a version of which has been proven for N = 2 in Bo¨rgers
(2013, Proposition 4.8).
Proposition 3 Consider a direct mechanism (q, t) with the property that there is a θ ∈ Θ
such that q(θ) = 1. This mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
ex post individually rational (EPIR), and ex post budget balanced (EPBB) if and only if
there are payments τˆi ∈ R with
∑
i∈I τˆi = c such that q(θ) = 1 and ti(θ) = τˆi for all i ∈ I
if θi ≥ τˆi for all i ∈ I, and q(θ) = 0 and ti(θ) = 0 for all i ∈ I otherwise.
Proof: It is easy to see that the given mechanisms satisfy DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB. In
what follows I prove the reverse.
Let θ ∈ Θ be such that q(θ) = 0. Then EPIR (Proposition 2) implies that ti(θ) ≤ 0
for all i ∈ I. EPBB implies that ∑i∈I ti(θ) = 0. Together this implies that ti(θ) = 0 for
all i ∈ I.
Together with Proposition 1 this implies that, using the terminology of Proposition 1,
we have that τˆi ≡ θˆi for all i ∈ I.
Denote by θ = (θ1, ..., θN) the vector of maximum values. Now suppose first that
q(θ) = 1 only if θ = θ. Then the result is trivially satisfied.
Thus, suppose that there is a θ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ such that q(θ) = 1 and let this θ be
otherwise arbitrary. By DSIC (Lemma 1 and the fact that τˆi ≡ θˆi) we have that τˆi(θ−i)
is weakly decreasing in all its arguments.
DSIC (Proposition 1) implies that q(θ) = 1 also. Now EPBB requires that
∑
i∈I τˆi(θ−i) =∑
i∈I τˆi(θ−i) = c. But as θi ≥ θi for all i ∈ I and as all functions τˆi are weakly decreasing
in all its arguments we must have that all τˆi(θ−i) = τˆi(θ−i). As θ with q(θ) = 1 was chosen
arbitrarily, this implies that for any such θ we must have that τˆi(θ−i) = τˆi(θ−i). Thus, all
payments are equal to the thresholds and all are constant. QED
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